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Abstract 
We study competitive positioning and pricing strategies in markets with negative consumption externalities. Negative 
consumption externality is modeled as a decrease in preference for a product as more consumers purchase the same 
product. Using a two stage Hotelling type model, we show that a cost leader prices higher than the cost disadvantaged 
firm when the magnitude of negative consumption externality in the market is below a threshold otherwise the cost 
leader prices lower than the cost disadvantaged firm. Also, increase in population density decreases price differential 
between the cost leader and the cost disadvantaged firm.
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     1 Introduction
It has been known for a long time that consumers’ product or service choices are affected by the
choices of other consumers (Veblen 1899). In some product categories, the utility of each consumer
increases with an increase in the total number of consumers purchasing the same brand and in such a
case consumers’ preferences are said to exhibit positive consumption externalities (Katz and Shapiro
1985). On the other hand, for conspicuous products, consumers’ need for uniqueness prevails and
each of them values the product less as more consumers own it, thus exhibiting negative consumption
externalities. Examples of conspicuous products markets include jewelry, perfumes, watches, high-
end cars, collectibles, etc. where exclusivity is fundamental to the value of the product.
There has been quite a bit of research done in the area of consumption externalities (see David
and Greenstein 1990, Shy 2001 for review). Negative consumption externalities have long been a
favorite topic of economic inquiry, but studies have normally abstracted from strategic behavior on
the production side (Hackner and Nyberg 1996). However, negative externalities affects the strategic
decisions of ﬁrms in many ways. For example, use of uniqueness appeals in advertising becomes
more prevalent for conspicuous goods (Pollay 1984). Firms may also strategically decide to restrict
availability in discount channels (Marketing Week 1997) or limit sales over the Internet (Curtis 2000).
Moreover, negative consumption externalities are likely to be important in markets for private goods
and services in that they affect the strategic interaction between ﬁrms. Integrating the research on
spatial competition with consumption externalities literature, Grilo et al. (2001) show that negative
externalities relaxes price competition. With a different consumer mix, Amaldoss and Jain (2005)
reach similar conclusions. But these results are obtained when ﬁrms are ex-ante identical but in
reality a number of factors (such as a ﬁrm’s proprietary technology, preferential access to suppliers,
degree of vertical integration, or learning from related activities, etc.) could distinguish ﬁrms from
each other. We assume that this asymmetry translates to cost difference among competing ﬁrms.
When ﬁrm differences are considered but consumption externalities are ignored, Tyagi (2001) shows
that in a horizontally differentiated market, a cost leader charges a higher price in equilibrium. But, in
reality, the relationship between cost leadership and pricing is not unambiguous. For example, Noble
and Gruca (1999) surveyed pricing practices of 270 managers and found that in competitive pricing
situations, a cost advantaged ﬁrm (due to lower supplier cost) prices lower than the competitor. But,
there are also instances where a cost leader in a horizontally differentiated market might charge higher
prices. For example, it is often argued that Procter & Gamble is the cost leader in many categories but
often charges higher prices in markets that typify horizontal differentiation. This absence of a clear
relationship between cost leadership and pricing suggests the need to incorporate other dimensions
of consumers utility which affects ﬁrms’ strategic behavior. Our starting point for this research is to
understand the positioning and pricing decision of asymmetric ﬁrms, given the "social need" among
consumers for uniqueness. This paper shows that in markets with negative consumption externalities,
if ﬁrms: (i) compete on horizontally-differentiable product characteristics alone, and (ii) choose their
product positions simultaneously before competing on prices, then a cost leader charges higher than
the cost disadvantaged ﬁrm only when the magnitude of negative consumption externality is below a
threshold. Thus, this paper extends the result obtained previously and presents a way to reconcile the
discrepancy between extant theoretical result and empirical evidence.
12 Model
We use the Hotelling framework (Hotelling 1929) and assume that the market consists of two ﬁrms
A and B, each offering one product recognized by subscripts A and B respectively. Consider the
following sequence of decisions. First, ﬁrms A and B; simultaneously choose locations a and b
respectively. After the ﬁrms have made their location choices, ﬁrms simultaneously choose their
prices, pA and pB and consumers buy the product that maximizes their utility. The speciﬁc model
assumptions are described below in greater detail.
1. We assume that the consumers are distributed uniformly in the unit interval [-0.5, 0.5] and the
total number of consumers is N.
2. We assume that the intrinsic utility of the product to every consumer is denoted by V , and
it is the same for both products A and B. Let us deﬁne ￿ to be the negative consumption
externalities parameter (￿ < 0). Let nA represent the customer base of ﬁrm A and nB represent
the customer base of Firm B (nA + nB = N). We assume that the consumer reservation price
is V +￿nA for product A and V +￿nB for product B. Therefore, each consumer is worse off as
the number of consumers purchasing from the same store increases. The consumer reservation
price is assumed to be sufﬁciently large so that all consumers buy one of the two products.
3. Consumers incur a quadratic transportation cost i.e. a consumer located at x incurs a cost of
t(x ￿ xi)
2 to purchase from the ﬁrm located at xi (xi = a;b) where t is the transportation cost
parameter. This is more realistic as the consumer’s marginal disutility of consuming a product
away from their ideal point is increasing (Neven 1985).
4. Following Tabuchi and Thisse (1995), ﬁrms are not restricted to locate within the interval of
consumers’ ideal points. Also, as ﬁrms choose locations simultaneously, our analysis excludes
the possibility of any ﬁrst mover advantage. Firms A and B incur marginal costs cA and cB
respectively to manufacture the products (cB > cA). We assume that ﬁrms have perfect infor-
mation about costs, both their own as well as their competitors.
5. Once ﬁrms’ locations and prices are determined, the consumers have perfect information about
them. Each consumer’s choice problem is to purchase one and only one product from the ﬁrm
which provides him/her with the highest utility.
3 Analysis
Without loss of generality, assume that the cost leader (Firm A) is located to the left of the other ﬁrm
(Firm B). The location of the marginal consumer is given by
~ x =
￿





=(2t(b ￿ a) ￿ 2N￿) (1)
where ~ x 2 [￿0:5;0:5]: All consumers to the left of the marginal consumer purchase from the cost
leader.
2Given the marginal consumer, the proﬁts of the two ﬁrms are given by










































where (cB ￿ cA) is restricted to the interval (0; 9t
4 ￿ 3N￿] to ensure that both ﬁrms get positive
market shares in equilibrium.1






























cB ￿ N￿: (3b)






(cA ￿ cB + 3N￿ + a2t ￿ b2t + 3at ￿ 3bt)
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(￿cA + cB + 3N￿ ￿ a2t + b2t + 3at ￿ 3bt)
2
t(b ￿ a) ￿ N￿
:

















1Note that as j￿j increases, the interval increases.





t(b￿a)￿N￿ < 0;i = A;B; (as ￿ < 0): Therefore, the second order condition is
satisﬁed.




















@b2 < 0 and the second-order condition is satisﬁed. Among the three other possible roots to the ﬁrst order















2 + tcA ￿ tcB
￿
:
3The cost advantaged ﬁrm cannot make higher proﬁts by undercutting the competing ﬁrm and
driving it out of the market.4 To see this, consider the situation where it has the highest possible
marginal cost advantage over the competitor, i.e. cB ￿ cA = 9t
4 ￿ 3N￿. The cost advantaged ﬁrm
needs to beat the delivered price of the competitor by N j￿j (so as to make the marginal consumer





with complete market coverage. Using the equilibrium locations in (4a) and (4b); the cost advantaged
ﬁrm makes a proﬁt of N (3t ￿ 2N￿), ensuring undercutting is not proﬁtable.















which gives pB ￿ pA = 1
3(3t￿4N￿) (3t + 4N￿)(cA ￿ cB):







a cost leader charges higher prices otherwise it charges lower prices.
Proof. Follows from (5a) and (5b).
The intuition for this result is as follows. When j￿j increases, higher market share is undesirable.
Therefore, the cost leader moves away from the center of distribution of consumers providing the cost
disadvantaged ﬁrm with an opportunity to increase market share which in turn, forces the cost leader
to lower prices in order to increase proﬁts.
Because population density also plays a role in how negative consumption externalities affects
consumers’ willingness to pay, we study the impact of population density on ﬁrm prices and proﬁts. If














2 (cB ￿ cA) < 0; and (6a)
d
dN
(￿A ￿ ￿B) =
4
3(3t ￿ 4N￿)




2 ￿ 12Nt￿ + 9t
2￿
> 0: (6b)
This leads to the following result.
Proposition 2 In a market with negative consumption externality, as population density increases,
the proﬁt differential between the cost leader and the cost disadvantaged ﬁrm increases but the price
differential goes down.
Proof. Follows from (6a) and (6b).
4I thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.
4Note that as population density increases, the cost leader as well as the cost disadvantaged ﬁrm
have an incentive to raise their prices in order to further reduce their customer base. Furthermore, the
cost leader’s market share decreases because an increase in population makes the cost leader’s product
relatively less attractive. This reduction in disparity in the market shares of two ﬁrms coupled with
higher prices reduces the incentive to engage in price competition. Therefore the price differential
decreases as population density increases. But, the total customer base of the cost leader increases at
a faster rate as the population density increases.5 Therefore, the proﬁt differential increases.
Thus, this analysis provides a richer understanding of the forces driving pricing decisions of ﬁrms
in conspicuous goods markets compared to standard models of product differentiation.
4 Conclusions
This paper studies the pricing decisions of asymmetric ﬁrms competing in horizontally differenti-
ated product markets where negative consumption externalities exist. The paper shows how if ﬁrms:
(i) compete instead on horizontally-differentiable product characteristics alone, and (ii) choose their
product positions simultaneously before competing on prices, then a cost leader charges higher than
the cost disadvantaged ﬁrm only when the magnitude of negative consumption externality is below a
threshold. We also ﬁnd that as the population density increases, the price differential between the cost
leader and the cost disadvantaged ﬁrm decreases. Thus, the results suggests that whether one should
expect a cost leader in a horizontally differentiated market to charge a price lower than its competi-
tors (and the extent of price differences) depends on the relative magnitude of negative consumption
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